In 2] Buchmann and Williams presented a new public key exchange system based on imaginary quadratic elds. While in that paper the system was described theoretically and its security was discussed in some detail nothing much was said about the practical implementation.
The Di e-Hellman scheme
In their paper \New Directions in Cryptography" 3] Di e and Hellman introduced in 1976 the idea of public key exchange. By this method it is possible to communicate a secret key for some cryptosystem over a public insecure channel. We brie y review the idea of Di e and Hellman. Suppose that Alice (A) and Bob (B) wish to secretly exchange a key.
(i.) A chooses a nite group G and { at random { an element 2 G. Both In order to be able to apply this algorithm in practice it is necessary to have an efcient multiplication routine in G i.e., if all the elements are represented by numbers in f0;1;:::;jGj ? 1g the representation of the product of two elements of G should be computable in time polynomial in log jGj.
Then, using the method of binary shifting (see 6, p. 441 .]) powers of group elements can be computed very e ciently even for large exponents d, namely in O(log d) elementary operations in G.
The scheme is secure if the key cannot be guessed easiliy and cannot be determined easily from the public information.
To avoid the key beeing guessed easily it is necessary to choose a group G of very high order, to pick a starting element of high order (close to jGj) and to select large exponents a and b. To make sure that the choice of G is adequate one has to analyse its arithmetic properties carefully. A neccessary condition is that the determination of discrete logarithms in G is di cult. Note, however, that this condition is not su cient for the security of the system because the determination of ab from , a and b might be easier than the calculation of a and b from , a and b .
So far the following groups have been suggested:
The group G = GL n (Z Z=pZZ) of invertible n n-matrices over the nite eld (Z Z=pZZ). ( 14] 
The group of points on an elliptic curve over a nite eld. ( 11] ) Several groups associated with higher dimensional varieties. ( 7] )
The group G = (Z Z=nZZ) where n is the product of two large primes. ( 10] 
The class group of an imaginary quadratic eld. ( 2]) In this paper we continue the discussion of the case where G is the class group of an imaginary quadratic eld. 2 The class group of an imaginary quadratic eld First we summarize the main facts concerning imaginary quadratic elds. All these facts are well known and therefore will be given without proof. Proofs of the statements made here and more detailed descriptions can be found in standard texts like Hua 5] 
There are the following main facts concerning reduced ideals:
For each reduced ideal we have L(a) < q j j=3. Every ideal class of O K contains exactly one reduced ideal.
Each ideal class can be represented by its reduced ideal. So the arithmetic in the class group of imaginary quadratic elds can be reduced to ideal-arithmetic: In order to determine the product of two ideal classes multiply their reduced ideals and compute the reduced ideal equivalent to this product. Since every reduced ideal is presented by a pair of integers which are less than q j j=3 in absolute value class groups can be used in the Di e-Hellman scheme if multiplication and reduction of ideals can be carried out e ciently. The secret key must be one of the integers of the normal presentation of the reduced ideal computed in the scheme. 3 The algorithms In 2] it is pointed out that D has to be of order of magnitude 10 200 to guarantee high security of the scheme. Also the exponents should be of this order of magnitude. So rst of all we need a multi-precision integer-arithmetic for implementing the scheme. For details see 6] or 1].
After the initialization all computations have the following structure: For an integer n and an ideal class ? given by its reduced ideal a ? compute the reduced ideal in ? n , i.e. the reduced ideal equivalent to (a ? ) n . This can be done by means of the well known fast exponentiation technique described in 6, p. 441].
Algorithm 3.1 (Exponentiation of ideal classes) Input: Reduced ideal a, exponent n 2 ZZ >0 . Output: Reduced ideal b equivalent to a n (1) N n; b 1-ideal; c a; (2) if N is even then goto (5) Note that the new presentation is well de ned and unique. For the multiplication we use an algorithm based on Shanks 15] which computes a primitive ideal equivalent to the product of two primitive ideals: Now we discuss ideal reduction. In order to decrease the size of the coe cients of the ideal representation whenever it is possible the ideals are reduced after each multiplication in Algorithm 3.1. So the reduction algorithm is applied very frequently and therefore it is necessary to have a fast reduction method. Our method is a re nement of the following well known algorithm (see 8] or 9]). (1) C A=B; R A mod B;
Now we present the re nement of the algorithm which was theoretically described in 2]. The computation of the new value of A in each iteration in the optimized version needs one division of multi precision integers less than in the rst version because the division in step 3 is avoided. Instead of this the value of A from the preceeding iteration is used. Therefore this simpli cation cannot be made up in the rst iteration. So step 2 of Algorithm 3.6 contains the rst iteration of Algorithm 3.4.
The computation of the rounded quotient of A and B is avoided in the optimized version. Moreover the sign of B is stored in a seperate variable s. In this way one multiplication of multi precision integers in each iteration is avoided.
The following theorem makes sure that algorithm 3.6 indeed computes the reduced ideal equivalent to the input ideal in nitly many iterations. Moreover an estimation for the number of iterations is given. In 2] this theorem was proved for Algorithm 3.4 which requires one more iteration. To analyze the multiplication and squaring algorithm we rst need to know the number of elementary operations necessary to compute the gcd's. This computation can be done by the euclidian algorithm 6, p. 325]. If one has to compute a gcd and both coe cients of its representation the euclidian algorithm needs one division, three additions and three multiplications in each division step. This case will be called \gcd2". If one has to compute a gcd and only one of the coe cients of its representation one can avoid some computations. Then the euclidian algorithm only needs one division, two additions and two multiplications in each division step. This case will be called \gcd1". Proof: Both statements follow immediately from the previous results. Note that according to Theorem 4.1 (c) the binary length of the integers occuring in our scheme is O(log jDj). 2
The theorem shows that both versions of the reduction algorithm have the same asymptotical complexity. The improvement in the optimized version only a ects the O-constant as can be seen from Theorem 4.3. We see that using fast multiplication techniques the running time of our method for public key exchange is a cubic polynomial in the length of the input data. Therefore it is executable for big exponents and big discriminants.
Running time statistics
The method for public key exchange has been implemented on a SIEMENS 7580-S computer of the University of D usseldorf 4]. The programming language was FORTRAN-77. For the multi-precision arithmetic we used the classical algorithms. These and some procedures to get the running time statistics presented below were taken from the number theoretic subroutine library KANT.
We computed many examples where the value of D was the product of two prime numbers each of size up to 10 100 . This choice of D was done according to the remarks in 2] concerning the security of the method. Both cases r = 1 and r = 2 occured equally often.
In the table below The comparison of the values in column 8 and 9 shows that the maximum number of iterations in the reduction algorithms is about half of the theoretical bound. The comparision of the average running time for the two versions of the reduction algorithm shows that there is indeed an important speeding up. The optimized version only requires 20% or less of the running time of the classical version. Most of this gain is caused by avoiding one multi precision division in each iteration. Note that the optimized version of the reduction algorithm is nearly as fast as the multiplication of ideals. Note also that there is almost no di erence in the average running time of the multiplication and the squaring algorithm. Here the theoretical improvement has no practical e ect. The examination of the total running time of the program con rms the complexity result given in Theorem 4.6. Now we give the data computed by our program for the rst ve examples mentioned in the table above. These examples have the highest values of D.
We list the information to be transmitted over the public channel (D, the starting ideal class and the ideal classes = a and = b ) and also the secret information (the exponents a and b and the ideal class ? = ab which gives the secret key).
Note that even if we use low exponents like in the rst example the secret key has a reasonable size of about q jDj. 
